What future can have the current Sino-russian strategic partnership?
Although different from the cultural
point of view, the two countries have come to form the current strategic
partnership mainly for economic reasons. Politically, Russian
and Chinese leadership militates against the current unipolar international
system, in which US has the status of unique
superpower. Russia's decision to strengthen, in
particular, the cooperation with China economically and militarily was taken
amid worsening diplomatic relations with the U.S. and EU. The biggest winner of the current international situation is China,
which in exchange for its support to the Russian government,
will demand to sustain the Chinese claims in the Asia-Pacific region.
Falling apart Europe, Russia is most likely to become
dependent on the partnership with China.
USSR and China: between cooperation
and rivalry
In the
Russian Civil War, which began with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Beiyang
Government (a series of military regimes that ruled from Beijing from 1912 to
1928), decided to join
the troops loyal to the Tsar, beginning with 1918. The city of Harbin, located
in Manchuria, became in
1917, the basis for the White Russians, in their fight against the Bolshevik
government, that lasted until the beginning of the 30s.
The Soviets
decided to support in the first phase, an alliance between the Chinese
Communist Party, founded in 1921 by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, and the
Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party led by General Chiang Kai-shek.
In May 1924, the Chinese
government and Soviet signed an agreement establishing diplomatic relations.
Chiang
Kai-shek's decision to abandon in 1926 the Soviet advisers and exclude the Communist
members of the Chinese government, prompted the Soviets to provide limited
support for Chinese Communists during the Chinese Civil War, which ended with
the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 by Mao Zedong.
Soviet support was manifested
especially during the existence of the Soviet Republic of China in the
provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian (1931-1937), a state founded by Mao and Zhu De.
At the end
of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, Soviet Army distributed some
of the weapons of the captured Kwantung Army to the Chinese Communist Party,
who were still fighting against the KMT led by Chiang Kai-shek
Sino-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship signed in 1950, between China and the USSR, but it was not at all satisfactory for Stalin, who was
forced to abandon the naval bases of Port Arthur and Dalian, returned to
Communist China.
As a result,
the treaty failed to eliminate tensions in Sino-Soviet relations, which will
deteriorate rapidly from the 50s and 60s, leading took the Sino-Soviet split during
the Cold War (1960-1989). The split had an ideological issue. With the coming of Nikita Khrushchev
at the forefront of the CPSU, the Soviet Union decided to promote peaceful
coexistence in relation to the Western democracies. Mao Zedong wanted instead to maintain
a belligerent attitude towards the West.
Sino-Soviet
split advantaged especially the U.S., which managed to improve diplomatic
relations with China, during the Nixon Administration. The break in diplomatic relations
between the USSR and China was on the verge of degenerating into a war during
the Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969). With the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping, the gap between
China and the USSR, becomes a manifest conflict , in which the
Chinese Communists demanded USSR to fulfill 3 conditions for normalizing bilateral
relations:
·
Reducing the number of Soviet army stationed at
the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia
·
Retracting the support for the Vietnamese
occupation of Cambodia
·
The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
Deng
Xiaoping’s commitment to peace and development was one of the factors that
contributed to Sino-Soviet normalization in the 1980s and laid the foundation
for the development of strategic partnership since the 1990s.
Redefining Russian-Chinese relations
after the collapse of the USSR
After the
collapse of the USSR, Moscow liberal movements have continued to fuel
suspicions of leadership in Beijing, preventing ideological consensus. This
uncertain situation persists until 1992, when the Russian-Chinese relations
began to gradually return to normal.
The change
of direction in Russian-Chinese bilateral relationship takes place in April
1996 when President Yeltsin with his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin signed a
document formally establishing a "strategic partnership" between the
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. The act was seen as a symbol of
reconciliation after years of "freezing" in the Sino-Soviet
diplomatic relations. The
signing of the strategic partnership between Russia and China was not followed by immediate implementation
of concrete measures to improve Russian-Chinese cooperation in various fields
of interest, such as economic and military.
Russian
hesitancy manifested even at the beginning of the presidency of Vladimir Putin,
to favor a single international actor is the main cause of the slow progress in
the Sino-Russian bilateral relations. Russian-Chinese strategic partnership began to be implemented
only in 2003. Russia and
Communist China finally learned to seek common ground on issues related to
Russian Far East, migration, bilateral economic ties, energy, multilateralism
in the Central Asia, the tense situation in the Korean peninsula and East Asian
regionalism and the relations with the other three countries with strong
interests in the Asia-Pacific region (USA, India and Japan). President Putin
has taken several decisions for the relief of the tense situation in the
Russian Far East:
·
forbade any interference of regional governors
in Russia's international relations, as it was the case of Evgeny Nazdratenko, Governor of Primorsky
Krai
·
In
the fall of 2004, it was made a new demarcation of the Russian-Chinese
border, which transferred to China, part of an island located near Khabarovsk.
Chinese Migration in the Russian regions, however, is a source of
concern, given that many companies, even with Russian capital, are seeking cheap labor force from China.
Smuggling and tax evasion are
other issues linked to the Chinese businesses in Russia. In an attempt to establish a new
control in the Russian-Chinese border trade (trade with timber, fish and
precious metals), Putin dismissed in the 2006, several leaders within the
Russian tax authorities.
The main reason for the rapprochement between Russia and
China is too challenging the unipolar nature of the current international
system, where the U.S. is trying to defend its status of unique superpower.
September 11 also played a role
in redefining the bilateral Russian-Chinese relations, with the war against
terrorism launched by the Bush Jr. Administration.
China-Russia military
ties
Chinese Russian military cooperation, despite some
hesitations which are based on past obstacles, extended both in arms industry and joint military planning implemented in
Russian-Chinese military exercises. . Russian-Chinese military relations were often influenced by
the personality of leaders in power both in Russia and in China. Each of these
leaders, want Russian-Chinese military relationship to develop in a slightly
different direction and at a different pace. For example, while an officer of the Russian General
Staff would recommend caution in selling the latest Russian military
technology, a plant manager of a state-owned arms factory should urge
their co-production with China, seeking profit.
According to the statement of Konstantin Makienko, deputy
director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Techniques based in
Moscow, the secret that floats
above military cooperation with China,
is better hidden than in the case of
similar relationships with countries such as India or Malaysia.
Russian arms sales to China have begun to rise since the
early 90s. Makienko estimates that the first delivery
contract of military equipment to China
(especially SU-27 fighters ) was signed in 1991. The first 26 Su-27 aircrafts were delivered to China
in 1992. Since 1996, the
Chinese have obtained the license for co-production of Su-27 aircraft from the
Sukhoi Design Bureau, but without the approval of the Russian leadership.
The export of Russian military
equipment in the 90s reached an unmanageable character. In the first years after the fall of
the USSR, the Russian state did not have enough resources to fund the military
industrial complex inherited from the Soviets, forcing many armament factories
to conclude supply contracts with foreign countries, in order to survive.
China and India have been from the beginning the main buyers
of Russian weapons. Almost every year, China buys Russian weapons worth
at least $ 1 billion. In 2013,
Russia took first place among arms exporting states, with sales totaling $ 8
billion.
Russia and China support each other to create a multipolar
international system, thus increasing the spectrum of military cooperation.
In May 2014 the two countries
had planned naval exercises in the East China Sea, in the context of growing
tensions between China and Japan linked over the ownership of Diaoyu Island /
Senkaku, currently administered by Japan.
Regarding the Chinese military doctrine, it aims to combat
possible threats on regional level. In this doctrine called peripheral the Chinese navy plays a
crucial role (the Taiwan Strait is the most vulnerable that the Chinese navy
should monitor it).
Most likely, given the poor relations with the U.S. due to
the crisis in Ukraine, Russia will decide to sell cutting edge military
technology to China. First,
it is very likely that Russia will start selling air defense systems S-400 and
assign co-production license of China. In the future it is expected that Russia will expand military
cooperation with China in space and nuclear industry.
A strategic partnership with China, offers Russia the chance
to develop economically and to strengthen security on the southern flank, at
least for now. At the
same time the Russian-Chinese partnership has some risks that cannot be denied.
Russia may arm a potential
opponent, which will eventually threaten Russian national interests. China may prove to be a
disappointment, as was the case of Nazi Germany, with which the USSR was allied
before the German invasion in June 1941. In order to not repeat the mistakes of the past, Russian
strategists, however, continue to keep a shadow of doubt regarding military and
economic partnership with China.
Current energy ties
between Russia and China
For Russia, China is an alternative market for its natural
gas. In the current
context of strained relations between Russia and Europe, due to annexation of
Crimea and the severe crisis in Ukraine, the Kremlin has implemented a backup
plan, which provided for the extension of the pipeline and negotiation of a new
gas supply contract with the People's Republic China.
Businesses in the energy sector are the main component of
Russian-Chinese economic relations. During President Putin's visit to Shanghai in May 2014,
Russia signed a contract with China for natural gas supply on a period of 30
years. The contract
value exceeds 400 billion dollars. As Alexei Miller declared, Chairman of Gazprom's, the new
contract with China could affect the price of gas supplied to European
consumers. By 2018,
Russia should build another pipeline to transport to China annually, a volume
of 38 billion cubic meters of gas. The investment on the energy market in China allows
Gazprom's, to recover some of the loss of the European market, where demand is
stagnating.
Regarding Central Asia, a region of geostrategic importance
and rich in energy reserves, Russia has not tried to block the influence of
China, which began to invest in the exploitation of energy resources of
Turkmenistan. Turkmen
authorities have agreed to supply China through a gas pipeline which will be inaugurated in
2014. It remains to be seen how will Kremlin perceive, in the future, this
competition from China on the energy market of Central Asia.
How sustainable can be
the present Sino-Russian alliance?
The sustainability of Russian-Chinese alliance will be
determined by the degree of mutual trust. If relations with Western democracies will improve in the
future, Russia may
meditate if is in her advantage to have a partnership so closely with China,
especially at the military level. Eventually, China is becoming the dominant power in the
alliance with Russia, and Chinese leaders priority is to recover Taiwan and
gain the supremacy in the global economy. Chinese leadership cares less of the Russian plans to create
a multipolar world.
As it happens in a diplomatic relationship of two strong
countries, China will soon ask for something in return for her tacit support of
Russia in Ukraine (it could not be a direct support because Chinese leaders do
not want to encourage separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang). China will require the Russia's
support in the differences it has with neighboring Asian countries, especially
Japan. Russia risks
becoming completely dependent on trade with China and its diplomatic support,
if will not improve her relations with the West.
Another major problem is demographic pressure on the
Russian-Chinese border which could become a big problem for Russia, since
Siberia is largely depopulated. A massive population of Chinese immigrants
would put this area under the de facto control of the Chinese state. To restore a balance in the
Asia-Pacific region, a close cooperation with India will be indispensable for
Kremlin. To not become a
country subordinated to China, Russia should expand its influence in the
region.
Bibliography
James Bellacqua, The Future of China-Russia Relations,
University Press of Kentucky, 2010.
R.K.I. Quested, Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History,
Rutledge, 2014.
Odd Arne Westad, Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the
Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963, Stanford University Press, 1998.
Alekseĭ Dmitrievich Voskresenskiĭ, Russia and China: A Theory
of Inter-state Relations, Psychology Press,2003.
